The decision making in fault diagnosis methods generally relies on the analysis of fault signature vectors. The current paper presents a new approach of decision making for the signature vectors for various identical or similar faults. The main contribution of the paper consists in the fusion between the reliability and the evaluation of the residuals in order to increase the fault isolation efficiency. The decision making, formalized as a Bayesian network, is established with a priori knowledge on fault signatures, false alarm and missing detection probability, online component state estimation computed by a Bayesian fusion of the component reliability, and measurements. The effectiveness and performances of the method are illustrated on a heating water process corrupted by various faults.
INTRODUCTION
Modern control systems are becoming more and more complex. Consequently, there is a growing demand for fault diagnosis to increase the reliability of such systems. In this context, the fault diagnosis domain has gained increasing consideration. A fault is considered as malfunction in the actual system that tends to degrade the overall system performances. In the current paper, attention is focused on model-based fault diagnosis that makes use of the analytical relationships between measured variables. A short historical survey on fault diagnosis can be found in reference [1] and various approaches have been reported in reference [2] . The fault diagnosis procedure consists of three stages:
(a) residuals generation: associates a model observation pair to evaluate difference with respect to the normal operating conditions;
(b) residuals evaluation: the residuals are compared to some predefined threshold according to a test and, at this stage, symptoms are produced; (c) decision making: the role of the decision making is to decide, according to the symptoms, which elements are faulty, that is isolation.
This requires the design of residuals that are close to zero in the fault-free situations while clearly deviating from zero in the presence of faults. These residuals possess the ability to discriminate between all possible modes of faults, which explains the use of the term 'decision making'. Classically, decision making is realized according to an elementary logic. Nevertheless, when multiple faults or false alarms occur, the faults cannot be isolated [3] . Some specific mathematics algorithms can improve the efficiency of the decision making, for instance:
(a) methods have been proposed, which increase the robustness of residual by decoupling the effects of faults from each other and from the modelling errors and uncertainties [4, 5] ; (b) a method has been developed based on the adaptive threshold approach to reduce the sensitivity of the residuals evaluation against false alarms [6] .
However, the binary data produced by residuals evaluation are poor. Moreover, the degree of isolability based on Hamming distance as suggested by Cassar [7] is very low. Consequently, some other knowledge related to the residuals should be considered for isolation. Qualitative and quantitative knowledge have been combined to improve the fault diagnosis efficiency [8, 9] . In the spirit of work carried out by Isermann [10] , fault isolation performance may be increased by integrating extra information in the diagnosis process. Thus, reliability, classically computed by means of stochastic process model as Markov chains (MC), defines the a priori behaviour of the probability distribution over the nominal states and faulty states of the system. Also, this additional information is seldom used to improve decision making in model-based fault diagnosis [11] .
The aim of the current paper is to propose a new approach that increases the performance of the decision making in fault diagnosis by taking into account a priori knowledge on the system state through a dynamic Bayesian network (BN).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the principle of the decision making in modelbased fault diagnosis and the fault isolation problem is stated. Section 3 describes the method that achieves the decision making based on the BN inference. Then, the proposed approach used to merge both the fault diagnosis and the dynamic reliability is presented. The proposed approach is illustrated through a simulation example in section 4. Finally, conclusions and perspectives are given in section 5.
PROBLEM STATEMENT

Symptoms generation
The first step produces indicators sensitive to the faults. These indicators are defined as residuals, noted 'r'. A residual is defined as the difference between a measurement and the corresponding reference value estimated with a model of the fault-free system ( Fig. 1) .
While a single residual is sufficient to detect a fault, a set of residuals is required for fault isolation. Several methods have been proposed in the literature to generate structured residuals and to perform the fault diagnosis [1] . One of the most popular is the observerbased design [12, 13] . The causal knowledgebased addressed in [14] deals with the complexity of large-scale systems. Another way to generate structured residuals is to develop models having an appropriate structure. The structured residuals may be generated by parity equations from the input-output model, or balance equations ( [4] ). The objective is to decouple the faulty effects from each residual. Each residual is designed so that it is sensitive to different faults or subsets of faults.
Usually, the second step of the diagnostic procedure, residuals evaluation, is based on the assumption that if a fault occurs, the statistical characteristic of the residuals is modified. The residuals evaluation involves statistical testing such as limit checking test, generalized likelihood ratio test, trend analysis test. The output vector of the statistical test, called coherence vector U, can be built according to a test applied to the set of J residuals: U ¼ [u 1 , . . .u j , . . .u J ] T where u j represents the status of the residuals: u j is equal to '0' when the residual signal is closed to zero in some sense and equal to '1' otherwise. u j is called the symptom associated to the residual r j Unfortunately, the residual is corrupted by noise, which affects the decision making. The efficiency of the detection is related to the false alarm and missing detection probability. In the residual evaluation, the problem may be formulated as a hypotheses testing problem. The main definitions are:
(a) H 0 : the residual is not affected by a fault (b) H 1 : the residual is corrupted by fault. More details can be found in the reference book of Basseville and Nikiforov [15] or in the second chapter of the book of Young and Calvert [16] .
The risk values a and b are calculated a priori if the density functions f(r(k),H i ) are known. However, this is rarely the case in practice. If the density functions are not available, then an estimation of the probabilities is computed by means of a frequentist approach based on data including a posteriori detection results.
Incidence matrix
Several approaches have been proposed to generate structured residuals and consequently to generate the incidence matrix [12] . Consider the following example where three different faults (F 1 , F 2 , and F 3 ) can be isolated by designing three symptoms u 1 , u 2 , and u 3 ( Table 1) .
In Table 1 , a '1' denotes that a symptom u j is sensitive to a fault (F 1 , F 2 , or F 3 ), while a '0' denotes insensitivity to a fault. This table is called an incidence matrix and can be considered as an a priori knowledge. Each column of the incidence matrix represents a fault signature: the vector [0 1 1] T corresponds to the signature of the faulty element F 1 . In the current paper, incidence matrix is annotated D with different elements D(n, j), where n is the number of elements suspected to be faulty (n ¼ 1. . .N) and j is the number of residuals (j ¼ 1. . .J).
Fault isolation
Usually, a very simple logic analysis between each fault signature F n and each coherence vector U is used to isolate the faulty component. In practical cases, false alarms occur and corrupt the decision logic. The coherence vector can be different from all signatures. Therefore, the goal of the decision making is to minimize the false alarms and missing detection rates due to the effects of modelling errors and unknown disturbances that affect residuals.
Moreover, in spite of the residuals generation and evaluation robustness, a simple logic rule is not efficient enough to isolate faults when simultaneous multiple faults occur [17] . This is justified by the fact that if D(n, j) ¼ 0, then u j cannot bring any information about the occurrence of fault F n , since the residual r j might be different from 0 owing to noise or modelling errors or another fault F k (with D(k, j) ¼ 1) affecting the system. Thus, a new decision-making method is necessary.
Moreover, a new source of information should be integrated in fault diagnosis. Bonivento et al. [18] have recently proposed to introduce reliability analysis for fault diagnosis purpose. System reliability analysis allows determining the degradation degree of the system components. The current paper aims at developing a method that integrates a dynamic reliability estimation of the system component as presented in the next section. In this new approach the reliability of the components is computed according to the states of the residuals (with the Bayesian approach) and not only an a priori estimation of the reliability. This is the reason why a dynamic computation of the reliability is used.
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DESIGN
3.1 Bayesian network equivalent to incidence matrix
Bayesian network
BNs are probabilistic networks based on graph theory. They are directed acyclic graphs used to represent uncertain knowledge in artificial intelligence [19] . Each node represents a discrete variable defined over several states and the arcs indicate direct probabilistic relations between the nodes. A discrete random variable X is represented by a node n with a finite number of mutually exclusive states s n m . A set of states is defined as S n : fs n 1 , . . . s n M g. A probability distribution over these states is defined as a vector p(n) with pðn ¼ s n m Þ (8m 2 [l, . . ., M]) is the marginal probability of n being in states s n m . As illustrated in Fig. 3 , nodes n i and n j are linked by an arc where n i is considered as a parent of n j .
A conditional probability distribution quantifies the probabilistic dependency between n j and its parent n i and is defined through a conditional probability table (CPT). Therefore, the nodes n i and n j are defined over the sets S n i : fs n i 1 , . . . s n i M g and S n j : fs n j 1 , . . . s n j L g. The CPT of n j is then calculated by the conditional probabilities p(n j |n i ) over each n j state according to its parents n i states as presented in Table 2 .
Concerning the root nodes, i.e. those without a parent, the CPT contains only a row including the a priori probability of each state.
Various inference algorithms can be used to compute marginal probabilities for each unobserved node given information on the states of a set of observed nodes. The most classical one relies on the use of a junction tree. Inference in BN then allows to take into Table 1 Incidence matrix example
Fig. 3 Elementary Bayesian network
Component reliability in fault-diagnosis decision making account any state variable observation (an event) such that it updates the probabilities of the other variables. Without observation, the computation is based on a priori probabilities. When observations are given, this knowledge is integrated into the network and all the probabilities are updated. Knowledge is formalized as evidence. A hard evidence of the random variable X indicates that the state of the node n is one of the states S n : fs n 1 , . . . s n M g. For instance, X is in state s n 1 : pðn ¼ s n 1 Þ ¼ 1 and pðn ¼ s n m 6 ¼ 1 Þ ¼ 0. Moreover, when this knowledge is uncertain, soft evidence can be used to define the distribution over n.
Bayesian network model as an incidence matrix
The relationship between symptoms and faults is represented by a graph. Obviously a fault can be considered as the cause of the residual deviation. Therefore, some connections can be established from the fault to the symptoms in order to define the relation of causality between fault occurrence and the symptom states, whereupon, a BN can define directly an incidence matrix D(n, j). Consider two incidence matrices that represent two different cases of possible isolability conditions ( Table 3) .
As depicted in Fig. 4 , each above incidence matrix is represented as an elementary graph with their appropriate arc, which corresponds to the link between fault signature and coherence vectors.
The fault occurrence probability is modelled as a random variable F n associated to each fault. F n is described by two states {not occurred, occurred }. Moreover, the symptoms are represented also as random variable u j defined over the set of two states: {not detected, detected } with p(u j ¼ detected ), if the fault affects the system and the residual r j is detected different from 0.
The probability distribution over the symptom states depends on the false alarms and missing detections. Using the BN model, a CPT is determined to model the relation between variables. In order to compute the probability distribution of symptoms u j , a CPT is defined according to the fault F n parent of u j . For instance, when only one symptom is associated to one fault, as presented at Fig. 4(a) , then the CPT is presented in Table 4 , where the probability b n of missing detection and the probability a n of false alarms both for the fault F n are defined such as
Therefore, the probability distribution over the states of the causes (fault occurrence) is based on the residual evaluation result. The node u j is defined as hard evidence. If changes in the residual are detected, then
Otherwise
The Bayes theorem is used to compute p(F n |u j ), for instance, relatively to Fig. 4 (a), p(F n |u j ) is equal to
where p(F n |u j ) is the a posteriori distribution of probability over the fault states according to the states of the symptoms. p(F n ) is the a priori distribution of Table 3 Two incidence matrices
Two structured Bayesian networks Table 4 CPT for node u j in Fig. 3(a) u j F n not detected detected not occurred 1Àa n a n occurred b n 1Àb n probability over the fault states and p(u j |F n ) are the conditional distribution over the symptoms. Generally, several faults are associated to one symptom, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b) . In this case, the CPT is more difficult to determine and it possesses a different structure from Table 4 . For instance, when one symptom is associated to few faults, as presented at Fig. 4(b) where few are equal to two, then the CPT is defined as in Table 5 .
The probability that a false alarm exists, when few faults are the cause of the residual deviation, is estimated independently to the faults. On the contrary, the missing detection depends on the fault, as a fault F 1 does not have the same impact on the residual as a fault F N . Consider that false alarms and missing detections estimated as follows
where not d. (resp. not o.) denotes 'not detected' (resp. 'not occurred'). The definition of false alarms and missing detections are represented Fig. 5 .
As presented in Table 5 , p(u j |F 1 ,F N ) is generated according to the incidence matrix defined in Fig. 4(b) . p(u j |F 1 ,F N ) is defined according to the missing detection rate b 1 (resp. b N ) and the false alarm rate a j for the fault F 1 (resp. F N ).
The Bayes theorem is applied in the BN inference algorithm to determine p(F N |u 1 ,u j ) from the states of the symptom u 1 and u j such as
where p(F N |u 1 ,u j ) is the a posteriori distribution of probability over the fault states according to the states of the symptoms and p(F N ) is the a priori distribution of probability over the fault states and pðu 1 jF N Þ.pðu j jF N Þ are the conditional distributions over the symptoms.
Dynamic model of reliability: a dynamic
Bayesian network solution [20] In order to model dynamic behaviour of the system performances degradation, dynamic BN has been considered.
In the framework of decision-making, a discrete random variable X with two states {up, down} is considered. These states represent respectively the operational and failure state of the component. Associated to a discrete random variable X, a matrix P X defines the probabilistic state transitions between (up) and (down)
where w du represents the failure probability of the component between sample kÀ1 and k w du ¼ pðX k ¼ downjX kÀ1 ¼ upÞ. Table 5 CPT for node u j in Fig. 3 In reliability analysis, l represents the failure rate of the component with w du % l · Dk where Dk represents the time interval between (kÀ1) and (k). It can be noticed that for a constant failure rate, the mean time to failure (MTTF) is equal to 1/l. Based on this elementary definition, a discrete-time MC is defined when the initial state probability vector is specified
The transient analysis of the MC based on the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation [21] provides an expression for p(X k ) with
Under dynamic consideration in a BN, the state of the variable X i (to model the ith component of a system) is represented at sample k by a node n i (k) with a finite number of states. p(n i (k)) denotes the probability distribution over these states at time step k. The dynamic BNs allow random variables and their impacts on the future distribution of other variables to be represented [22] . Starting from an observed situation at sample k ¼ 0, the probability distribution p(n i (k)) over M states for the component X i associated to the node n i is computed by the dynamic BN inference.
Indeed, it is possible to compute the probability distribution of any variable X i at sample k based on the probabilities defined at sample kÀ1 as shown in the elementary network presented in Fig. 6 .
The first slice contains the nodes corresponding to the current time step kÀ1, the second one contains the nodes of the following time step k. Observations, introduced as hard evidence or probability distributions, are only realized in the current time slice. The time increment is carried out by setting the computed marginal probabilities of the node at sample k as observations for its corresponding node in the previous time slice. The CPT in dynamic BN is equivalent to P X (Table 6 ).
Fusion of the incidence matrix and the dynamic Bayesian network model of reliability: a solution for increasing effectiveness of decision making
As presented previously, the dynamic BN models the component reliability, which takes into account the time degradation of components. The representation of incidence matrix as a graph, defined at the beginning of the paper, provides a formalism, which is used to realize the fusion between fault diagnosis and reliability model. The decision making is established after fusion of information obtained from both residual analyses and reliability estimation. Therefore, based on the BN representation, image of the incidence matrix, the dynamic evolution of the component reliability is taken into account on each node F i as follows, see Fig. 7 . This relationship involves the definition of a CPT. The CPT of F i is very simple to define if the component reliability is modelled with the states (up) or (down) which is a common case in fault diagnosis. Then identity matrix is used to compute the distribution on F i , as presented in Table 7 .
However, if more than two states are used to define n i (k), the CPT is defined to determine the occurrence of the fault according to the state of degradation of the component. Usually, each functioning state of n i (k) leads to the non-faulty state: (not occurred ), and each faulty state leads to the occurrence of the fault (Table 8) .
It should be possible that fault occurrence is caused by the failure of several components. Consider two components, the node n j (k) and n k (k) modelled the state of these components. The fault occurs when the components are in specific states. Then the combination of the component states is merging F i for instance with AND or OR gate according to the serial or parallel structure (Table 9 ) (or another combination of the components states). Based on the elementary example, illustrated in Fig. 6 , the computation of pðF i ju 1 ,u J ,n i ðkÞÞ is performed thanks to the inference algorithm in dynamic BN. A simplification of the formulation is presented by pðF i ju 1 ,u J ,n i ðkÞÞ ¼ pðF i ,u 1 ,u J ,n i ðkÞÞ pðu 1 ,u J ,n i ðkÞÞ
In this formulation the probability of failure occurrence is deduced from the reliability of the component n i (k) and the residuals states u i (k) and u J (k). Moreover, the back propagation (from F i (k) to n i (k)) allows to verify the coherence when computing the reliability of the component n i (k) according to the states of the residuals.
ILLUSTRATION EXAMPLE
Process description and fault diagnosis
To illustrate the current approach, a simulation example is considered: a heating water process. The process, illustrated in Fig. 8 , is composed of a tank with a section S equipped with two heating resistors R 1 and R 2 . The inputs are the water flowrate Q i , the water temperature T i and the heater electric power P. The outputs are the water flowrate Q o and the temperature T, which is maintained around an operating point. The temperature of the water T i is assumed to be constant. The objective of the thermal process is to provide a constant water flowrate at a given temperature.
Using the hydraulic and thermal equations, the system can be described by the following equations where the output vector y is equal to [T h] T and the input vector u defines [q i P] T . It should be noted that the sampling period is fixed to 360 s in order to respect the closed-loop time constants. Moreover, the measured output flowrate can be determined by using the Torriceli-rule as
where h defines the outflow coefficient. In this study, only sensor failures are considered: level sensor H, output temperature sensor T, and output flowrate sensor Q o . As indicated previously, several methods have been proposed in the literature to generate structured residuals and to perform the fault diagnosis [1] . However in this example, owing to the property of matrix A d (which is diagonal), structured residuals can be generated directly with a conventional observer: each residual is sensitive to one fault. Then based on the state space representation, a conventional Luenberger observer is considered to generate the residuals vector yðkÞÀŷðkÞ, such that x ðk þ 1Þ ¼ A dx ðkÞ þ B d uðkÞ þ K ðyðkÞÀŷðkÞÞ yðkÞ ¼xðkÞ ð14Þ Based on the residual evaluation of rðkÞ ¼ ½ r 1 ðkÞ r 2 ðkÞ r 3 ðkÞ T , the associated fault incidence matrix is defined in Table 10 .
Dynamic BN design for decision making
The proposed approach has been designed with the help of the software BayesiaLab (www.bayesia.com). The incidence matrix, defined in Table 10 , leads to a dynamic BN model presented in Fig. 9 .
For all faults of the system, the probability of missing detection is assumed to be fixed to 0.02 and the probability of false alarms is equal to 0.05. The probability of missing detection with two simultaneous faults is fixed to 0.01. Consequently as presented in section 3.1 (see Table 4 ) the CPT of u 1 , is defined in Table 11 , and also the CPT of u 3 (see Table 5 ) is defined in Table 12 .
In order to define the dynamic reliability model, Figs 10 to 12 present the MC and the MTTF, which is used to determine the failure rates l. This failure rate quantifies the transition between the states of three considered faulty components and associated probabilistic state matrix P x defined in equation (9) . The MCs of the components are supposed to be independent. It should be noted that two states {up, down} are considered for sensors Q o and H, but one more state (dgd ) is considered for sensor T, which corresponds to a degraded state of the component. As defined in section 3.2, the CPT used to simulate the MC for the sensor H (respectively T ) reliability described in Fig. 11 (respectively Fig. 12 ) is presented in Table 13 (respectively Table 14 ). The state (dgd ) is a functioning state so no fault occurred in this state as implemented in the CPT presented in Table 15 . 
Results and comments
Based on the incidence matrix (see Table 10 ) and under any assumptions of the number of faults, then if the coherence vector issued from the residual evaluation at sample k is equal to [0 0 1] T or to [1 1 1] T , for example, the fault indicators I generated by a logic test is as in Table 16 .
Because H and T fault signatures are different, and Q o fault signature is included in H fault signature, the fault isolation is not easy to perform: However, based on the current approach, it could be possible to optimize the maintenance action.
In order to illustrate the performance and the limitation of the proposed method, various faults scenarios have been considered. The dynamic behaviour of the structured residuals vector has been illustrated in the presence of the various faults scenarios in Fig. 13 .
Scenario A and Scenario B The residual sensitive
to a fault is affected. The other residuals are close to zero. 2. Scenario C The system is in a fault-free case. All residuals are close to zero. 3. Scenario D According to the fault incidence matrix issued from the structured residuals (see Table 10 ), all residuals are different from zero at sample k ¼ 26 when the sensor faults occur simultaneously.
These residuals are evaluated using the statistical test and are detected isolated correctly as shown in Fig. 14. 1. Scenario A. A false alarm occurs at sample k ¼ 6 which appears as an outlier on the first symptom which switch to '1' during one sample. 2. Scenario B. According to the structured residuals defined in the incidence matrix (see Table 10 ), only the third symptom switched to '1'. Few samples after the third symptom switch to '0' owing to a maintenance action. 3. Scenario C. During this period, no fault occurs.
Symptoms are equal to '0'. The failure probabilities for the three sensors are presented at Fig. 15 without taking into account the dynamic reliability of components. Figure 16 is devoted to the illustration method through the failure probabilities evolution including the dynamic reliability of components.
Scenario A
The outlier generates a false alarm, the CPT for T can only reduce the value of failure probability to 0.9515 computed based on the Bayes theorem according to the false alarm probability a T ¼ 0.05 and the missing detection b T ¼ 0.02 with a priori probability distribution: p(Fault T ¼ occurred) ¼ 0.5 and p(Fault T ¼ not occurred) ¼ 0.5 (see Fig. 15 ). However, as shown at Fig. 16 , the decision making is based on reliability of the component. Thanks to the Bayes theorem, the inference algorithm in the BN computes the reliability of the component taking into account the MC model with failure rate parameters and the online information based on the residual evaluation (symptoms). Therefore, if all the symptoms are known and close to 0 then the reliability of the component is close to 1. However, the fault is suspected to have occurred if the residuals deviate from zero. Another advantage, of taking reliability into account, lies in the fact that if the residuals states are not computed or if no ambiguity appears in the fault signature, then the knowledge relative to the reliability of the component is dominating. In this scenario, the integration of reliability and the symptoms result in similar way to a sliding window and therefore annihilate the false alarm.
Scenario B
The two BN methods isolate the fault. It could be noted that a time delay is observed for the second one due to reliability consideration. After three sampling periods, the probability of fault occurrence I Q is equal to one. The probability of the I H fault occurrence is increased. This fault generates deviation on residual u 3 but according to the inference in the BN, this fault is considered as not coherent with the states of the other symptoms. Therefore, the probability of the I H fault occurrence stays close to 0.
Scenario C
When a maintenance action is realized, the decision making is back to a fault-free case. The probability that the fault I Q occurred is re-initialized to zero.
Scenario D
This scenario highlights the proposed approach. Without reliability consideration, it is not possible to generate a suitable decision making. For multiple faults, all fault signatures can be suspected: the symptom u 3 is explained by the failure on sensor H, then the Q o failure probability is computed based on the Bayes theorem, equal to '0.5156' this value translates the uncertainty (see Fig. 15 ). However, according to the DBN, then the Q o failure probability increases by taking into account the reliability of components ( Fig. 16) . A priori the fault I Q has not occurred. Nevertheless, after long delay, the fault is suspected owing to the degradation of the component modelled in the DBN from the failure rate of the component. With the proposed method, it is possible to plan a maintenance action without visiting the Q sensor at the first place owing to the low level of failure probability. Then, the maintenance action can be focused to the others, T and H sensors, showing a higher level of failure probability.
CONCLUSION
The current paper presents a new strategy to increase the performance of the decision making in modelbased fault diagnosis. The developed approach consists in taking into account in fault diagnosis scheme a priori knowledge on the faulty or non faulty system by an MC modelling. Thanks to the Bayes theorem, the inference algorithm in the BN computes the reliability of the component taking into account the a priori MC model with failure rate parameters and the on-line information based on the residual evaluation (symptoms). Therefore, if all the symptoms are known and close to 0 then the reliability of the component is close to 1. For complex systems, the problem of the decision making when various fault signatures vectors are identical or similar can be allayed by using a suitable dynamic BN. The simulation example, a heating water process, has highlighted the performances of the method. The design of the dynamic BN requires the false alarms and mis-detection probabilities of the residual evaluation parameters that are not always possible to assess. Nevertheless, the results obtained in the current paper are encouraging and allow the method to be advocated in order to optimize the maintenance actions. Therefore, for a system which is liable to various occurring faults simultaneously or which is defined through an incidence matrix with similar fault signatures, the fault probabilities provided by the method will permit the maintenance actions to be planned. In future works an analysis will be made of the sensitivity of the decision making to the parameter as false alarms and mis-detection.
